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CASES AND CONTROVERSIES: PREGNANCY 
AS PROOF OF GUILT UNDER PAKISTAN’S 
HUDOOD LAWS 
Moeen H. Cheema∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Pakistan’s Hudood (Islamic criminal) laws have been a source of con-
troversy since their promulgation by the military regime of General Mu-
hammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1979. For their supporters, these laws are a wel-
come step towards the enforcement of shari’ah (Islamic law) and, as 
such, represent a logical and inevitable progression of those historic 
processes that had led to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
To their opponents, these laws represent gross violations of fundamental 
human rights and constitutional norms designed to uphold democratic 
participation in lawmaking and the equality of citizens irrespective of 
their religion or gender. However, despite the protests at home and the 
notoriety generated in the international media, these laws continue to 
exist on the statute books and are enforced in the courts of law. 
This paper will survey the contours of the controversies surrounding 
the Hudood laws, and seek to broaden the horizons of the debate sur-
rounding these laws by incorporating an “Islamic critique” of these laws 
that has generally been lacking in the discourse. More importantly, the 
paper seeks to analyze the role that the Federal Shariat Court has played 
in substantively shaping the law, through a chronological analysis of the 
Court’s decisions on the most contentious aspects of the Hudood laws: 
the conviction of rape victims for zina (consensual adultery/fornication) 
regarding as proof the pregnancy caused by the rape. This analysis will 
indicate the strengths of the Islamic critique and propose reforms that 
may offer a viable avenue for alleviating the hardships perpetrated in the 
application of the Hudood laws. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
he military regime of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq promul-
gated the controversial Hudood laws1 in its early years in power, 
                                                                                                             
 1. The Hudood laws were enacted through four Presidential Ordinances and one 
Presidential Order. See Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (VII 
of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 51 (1979) [hereinafter Offence of 
Zina Ordinance]; Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 (VIII of 
1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 56 (1979) [hereinafter Offence of 
Qazf Ordinance]; Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 
(VI of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 44 (1979) [hereinafter Of-
fences Against Property Ordinance]; Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordi-
nance, 1979 (IX of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 60 (1979) [herein-
after Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance]; Prohibition (Enforcement of 
Hadd) Order, 1979 (IV of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 33 (1979) 
[hereinafter Prohibition Ordinance]. Article 89 of Pakistan’s Constitution empowers the 
President to create laws via ordinances when the National Assembly is not in session and 
“circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action.”  PAK. CONST. 
art. 89, cl. 1, available at http://www.nrb.gov.pk/constitutional_and_legal/constitution. 
This provision enables the President to deal with any circumstances that require legisla-
T 
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ostensibly to further the process of “Islamization” in Pakistan.2 Grafted 
onto the country’s common law system, a remnant of British colonial 
                                                                                                             
tive action when the Parliament is not in session, for example, in the transitory period 
between elections. Such ordinances were envisaged as temporary measures that would 
lapse after four months unless adopted by the Parliament. However, having taken over 
power in a military coup in July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the elected Parlia-
ment and replaced it with a nominated assembly called the Majlis-e-Shoora. In the ab-
sence of Parliament, General Zia-ul-Haq used these law-making powers extensively, 
especially to further the process of “Islamization” of laws in Pakistan. See Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015, 1042–47 (1991). In 1985, parlia-
mentary elections were held on a non-party basis and the newly elected Parliament 
passed the notorious Eighth Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution. Article 270A of the 
Constitution was thereby amended to state that all ordinances, orders, and other laws 
made between July 5, 1977, and the date on which the Eighth Amendment came into 
force (thereby including the Hudood laws) were “affirmed, adopted and declared, not-
withstanding any judgment of any court, to have been validly made by competent author-
ity . . . .”  PAK. CONST. art. 270A, cl. 2. Thereafter, the Hudood Ordinances were ac-
corded the force equivalent to an Act of Parliament, and became entrenched in Pakistani 
law. 
 2. Many critics have questioned General Zia’s intentions as regards his Islamization 
program, or Nizam-e-Mustapha as he preferred to call it. See, e.g., ASMA JAHANGIR & 
HINA JILANI, THE HUDOOD ORDINANCES: A DIVINE SANCTION? 18 (1990). They allege 
that Zia, who had dismissed the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a coup d’etat, 
needed a political constituency in order to sustain his military rule and cunningly used the 
slogan of Islamization for this purpose. Id. Charles Kennedy contends that, despite sus-
tained rhetoric, the Zia administration deliberately maintained a slow pace for Islamiza-
tion. Charles H. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989, 63 
PAC. AFF. 62 (1990) [hereinafter Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan]. 
In support of this argument, Kennedy provides the following evidence: (a) the Federal 
Shariat Court was created with significant restrictions on its jurisdiction under Article 
203B of the Constitution, including a lack of jurisdiction in matters pertaining to Muslim 
personal law, fiscal laws, taxation, banking, and insurance; (b) Zia appointed a number of 
“Islamic moderates” to the Shariat courts, so that many of the judges who were responsi-
ble for interpreting the Islamic reforms were not the reforms’ most zealous advocates; (c) 
reform of the law of evidence (Qanoon-i-Shahadat) represented a much watered-down 
version of the obscurantist manifesto since it implemented only one of the amendments—
arguably the one with least practical impact—recommended by the Council of Islamic 
Ideology; and (d) two weeks after dismissing the government of Prime Minister Junejo 
on the grounds that it had failed to hasten the process of Islamization, Zia nevertheless 
entrusted jurisdiction of the Enforcement of Shariah Ordinance to the Pakistani High 
Courts instead of the Shariat courts. Id. at 64–71. Anita Weiss suggests another agenda 
behind Islamization: that one primary objective of Islamization, rather than a mere side 
effect, was the systematic reduction in the power and participation of women in the pub-
lic sphere. See Anita M. Weiss, Women’s Position in Pakistan: Sociocultural Effects of 
Islamization, 25 ASIAN SURV. 863, 876–77 (1985) (“Traditional Islamic law as applied in 
the South Asian context has favored the maintenance of extended patrilineal kinship net-
works and the control of women.”). 
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rule, the laws sought to criminalize extra-marital sexual relations3 and the 
consumption of alcohol,4 as well as to bring into conformity with Islamic 
injunctions rules relating to certain offenses against property.5 The laws 
also introduced punishments of rajm (stoning to death)6 and public 
whipping into the criminal laws of Pakistan.7 Concurrent with the prom-
ulgation of the Hudood laws, General Zia’s regime introduced a parallel 
judicial system consisting of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) and the 
Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court8 empowered to review 
and declare invalid any law found to be inconsistent with shari’ah (Is-
lamic law) injunctions.9 
                                                                                                             
 3. See Offence of Zina Ordinance § 4, supra note 1, at 52. 
 4. See Prohibition Ordinance §§ 3–16, supra note 1, at 34–37. 
 5. See Offences Against Property Ordinance pmbl., supra note 1, at 44. 
 6. See Offence of Zina Ordinance §§ 5–6, 17, supra note 1, at 52, 55. 
 7. See Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, supra note 1, at 60–62. 
In fact, while rajm was indeed a novel introduction to Pakistan’s penal system, it may not 
be accurate to describe whipping as either a new or an exclusively “Islamic” form of 
punishment. Whipping was an available punishment prior to the Hudood laws under the 
Whipping Act, 1909. See Whipping Act, 1909 (IV of 1909), available at 
http://www.pakistanlawyers.org (follow “Statutes and Rules” hyperlink). For example, in 
Farzand Ali v. State, 1971 S.C.M.R. 715 (Sup. Ct. 1971), a case predating the Hudood 
Ordinances, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence for rape and kidnapping offenses, 
which included a penalty of twenty lashes. This case is rare, however, and except for 
whippings carried out in jails for disciplinary reasons, whipping was rarely employed as a 
punishment under the general criminal laws prior to the Hudood laws’ enactment.  
 8. Initially, the shariat courts constituted part of the Pakistani High Courts. These 
courts were given judicial independence on May 26, 1980, after the insertion of Article 
203C to Pakistan’s Constitution. See PAK. CONST. art. 203C. The FSC consists of eight 
Muslim judges, three of whom are ulema (religious scholars). Id. cls. 2, 3A. The remain-
ing judges are appointed from amongst those who are qualified to be judges of the High 
Courts. Id. cl. 3A. The Chief Justice must be serving on the High Courts, or should be 
qualified to be a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Id. cl. 3. Any judge of the High 
Courts who refuses appointment to the FSC faces automatic retirement. Id. cl. 5. The FSC 
has the power to review any and all Pakistani laws to determine whether they are repug-
nant to the injunctions of Islam. Id. art. 203D, cl. 1. FSC decisions are supreme, binding 
the High Courts and all lower courts. Id. art. 203GG. As regards the Hudood laws, the 
FSC acts as a court of appeals. Id. art. 203DD. Appeals from judgments of the FSC lie 
before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. Id. art. 203F, cl. 1. The Shariat 
Appellate Bench consists of three Muslim judges of the Supreme Court as well as two ad 
hoc ulema judges appointed by the President. Id. cl. 3. These two appointed ulema judges 
are picked either from the FSC, or from a panel of ulema nominated by the President in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Id. cl. 3(b). 
 9. Commenting on the significance of this event, Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, retired 
Chief Justice of Pakistan, stated: 
The conferment of such a power of judicial review, with a view to Islamising 
the existing laws, has no parallel in judicial history. No such power was con-
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The promulgation of the Hudood laws received robust support from a 
small segment of Pakistani society: religious political parties and their 
most ardent followers.10 For these supporters, the laws were a welcome 
step towards the enforcement of shari’ah, and, as such, represented a 
logical and inevitable progression of those historic processes that had led 
to the creation of the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”11 The Hudood laws 
                                                                                                             
ferred on Courts during the Muslim Rule when Islamic Fiqh was the governing 
law . . . . This indeed was a most awesome and far-reaching power, without any 
parallel in the history of the Islamic world and also a very potent instrument for 
accomplishing the process of Islamisation of laws within the shortest possible 
period. This power was, in fact, availed of fully both by the Federal Shariat 
Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court for bringing about 
the Islamisation of existing laws. Indeed as a result of the decisions of these 
Courts and the consequential steps taken to implement them, a silent revolution 
has come about in the legal field. 
Nasim Hasan Shah, Islamisation of Law in Pakistan, 47 P.L.D. 1995 Journal 37, 41–42 
(1995). 
 10. Religious political parties have historically failed to garner significant support in 
general elections. See Hassan Abbas, Pakistan Through the Lens of the “Triple A” The-
ory, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 181, 186 (2006). However, such parties have, at vari-
ous times, enjoyed considerable power by virtue of their presence in governing coalitions. 
For example, the “MMA” (Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal), a coalition of six religious political 
parties, achieved unprecedented success in the latest general elections held in October 
2002, and currently commands a majority in the provincial legislature of the North West 
Frontier Province. B. Muralidhar Reddy, Pakistan’s Religious Parties Losing Ground?, 
THE HINDU, Sept. 2, 2005, at 2. 
 11. The demands for Islamization of laws are as old as Pakistan itself. According to 
Maulana Abul A’la Maudoodi, a renowned religious scholar, political activist, and the 
founder of the Jamaat’i Islami religious-political party: “The Pakistan movement was an 
expression of Muslim India’s firm desire to establish an Islamic State. The movement 
was inspired by the ideology of Islam and the country was carved into existence solely to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the Islamic way of life.”  MAULANA ABUL A’LA MAUDOODI, 
THE ISLAMIC LAW AND CONSTITUTION 10 (Khurshid Ahmad trans., Islamic Publications 
4th ed. 1969) (1955). Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah has expressed similar sentiments: “The 
main reason why the Muslims of undivided India demanded Pakistan was that they 
wished to have a State where they could live according to their own cultural values, tradi-
tions and Laws.”  Shah, supra note 9, at 37. However, despite expressing an aspiration of 
Islamization in the Objectives Resolution, 1949, the first Constituent Assembly of Paki-
stan, as well as later framers of the three Constituents of Pakistan, failed to give more 
than a lip service to the agenda of Islamization of laws. See Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of 
Religion & Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 40, 63 (1995). All three Constitutions, adopted in 1956, 1962, and 1973, in-
cluded “Islamic provisions” which sought the Islamization of laws through legislation 
upon the advice of advisory councils composed of religious scholars. However, the proc-
ess of Islamization did not take hold until the emergence of General Zia on the political 
scene, who gave the power of Islamization to the shariat courts. See William L. Richter, 
The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan, 19 ASIAN SURV. 547 (1979), 
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immediately generated vehement protests and criticism from an equally 
partial sector of the society:12 urban, “liberal,” and “Westernized” mem-
bers of human rights and women’s rights organizations who subscribed 
to the notion of “separation of church and state.”13 To these opponents, 
the laws represented gross violations of fundamental human rights, con-
stitutional norms designed to uphold democratic participation in lawmak-
ing, and the equality of citizens irrespective of their religion or gender.14 
However, despite the protests, the majority of Pakistani citizens, ignorant 
                                                                                                             
for a multi-faceted explanation of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan during the Zia regime in 
addition to Zia’s personal interest in raising the banner of Islamization. Richter attributes 
the revival to a number of socio-political factors: the search for a national identity after 
the Bangladesh debacle; increased ties and enhanced proximity with the Middle East; 
increase in the geo-political rise of the Middle East on account of oil wealth; broader 
Islamic revival in the region; and disillusionment with the failures of capitalism and so-
cialism in Pakistan. Id. at 549–57. 
 12. For a pictorial presentation of the protests held in opposition to the Hudood laws 
and their violent suppression by the military regime, see JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 
2, at 34–45. 
 13. See id. at 18, 21. According to these authors, one can group people into four cate-
gories based on their opinions of Hudood laws. First, there are the unrelenting obscur-
antists who fully support the laws. See id. at 18. Second, there are those amongst the fun-
damentalists who realize that these laws are defective but “do not ask for their repeal or 
amendment because they think it would generally undermine the process of Islamization 
of laws.”  Id. at 21. Third, there are the patchworkers: “Theirs is the mission of peace 
making. They do not advocate any radical positions. They neither support the law in full 
nor seek its repeal. They want to appease both factions through amendments here and 
there.”  Id. Fourth, and last, there are the secularist opponents who “reject religion as a 
basis or source of law.”  Id. 
 14. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, supra note 2, at 74. Ken-
nedy catalogues the criticisms leveled against the Hudood laws and Pakistan’s Islamiza-
tion program as follows: 
(a) The human rights argument. The punishments specified in the hudood ordi-
nances (stoning to death, amputation, whipping) constitute cruel and unusual 
punishments, and border on barbarism. (b) The reactionary argument. Nizam-i-
Mustapha is characterized as an attempt to set Pakistan back fourteen hundred 
years to the time of Rightly-Guided Caliphs. (c) The undemocratic argument. 
Zia’s Islamization program was designed to lend support to an unpopular mili-
tary regime. His policies had the effect of banning political parties and silenc-
ing political opposition. (d) The anti-minority argument. The Nizam-i-
Mustapha discriminates against non-Muslims, particularly the Ahmadiyya, and 
Christians. A corollary of this argument is that Nizam-i-Mustapha is dominated 
by the Sunni Hanafi fiqh, that is, it is anti-Shia. (e) The misogyny argument. Ni-
zam-i-Mustapha discriminates against the rights of women. And (f) the anti-
rational argument. Nizam-i-Mustapha is opposed to modernity and Westerni-
zation; and it is obscurantist. 
Id. 
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of the laws’ questionable Islamic credentials, weak doctrinal foundations, 
and numerous procedural defects, were swayed by the misleading label 
and remained approvingly silent.15 
Although the Hudood laws have been mired in controversy since their 
inception, limited meaningful public deliberation has occurred during the 
last two decades. The argumentation over the Hudood laws, as well as 
the process of Islamization, has been mostly journalistic and occasionally 
academic.16 This has served only to harden the two extreme positions, 
with the two sides talking at each other, rarely listening, and hardly 
changing any minds. 
Every democratically elected government constituted after the demise 
of General Zia, representing both sides of the political divide, has re-
frained from tinkering with the Hudood laws.17 This suggests an appre-
ciation on the part of the country’s lawmakers that the ideology of Islam-
ization, if not the Hudood laws themselves, has continued to command 
the allegiance of a substantial majority of the citizens.18 Significantly, the 
                                                                                                             
 15. JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 22. 
 16. Whereas Pakistan’s print media has historically betrayed a sensationalist bent, 
Western news media have exhibited a distinct bias against Islamic reforms. See Naz K. 
Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: INGOs and the Battle for Muslim Hearts and 
Minds, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 191–94 (2006). The portrayals of Hudood laws in 
both domestic and international media have also been particularly affected by the com-
plexity of these laws, resulting in perpetual repetition of inaccurate assertions. Unfortu-
nately, many of these inaccuracies have even filtered into academic discourse. See infra 
note 113 and accompanying text. 
 17. For example, Benazir Bhutto’s fierce opposition to Zia’s Islamization program 
formed the centerpiece of the Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP) election campaign in 1988. 
However, upon forming her government, Bhutto let the issues over Islamization fade 
from the public debate. As a result, the Hudood laws remained intact during the PPP 
governments of 1988-1990 and 1993-1996. See Saeed Shafqat, Pakistan Under Benazir 
Bhutto, 36 ASIAN SURV. 655, 657–58 (1996). 
 18. The “undemocratic” critiques of General Zia’s Islamization program implicitly 
concede this point. See JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 22. However, Richard Kurin 
questions the assumption of widespread support for the Islamization process amongst 
Pakistan’s mostly rural population. Richard Kurin, Islamization in Pakistan: A View from 
the Countryside, 25 ASIAN SURV. 852 (1985). His personal observations from a village in 
Central Punjab, recorded during 1978 and 1983, indicated only a limited influence of 
state-sponsored Islamization upon the daily lives of the villagers. Id. at 861. Kurin re-
marks that the villagers continued to exclude religious teachers from public decision-
making, play cards, listen to loud music, refrain from praying and fasting, and condone 
adulterous affairs long after the enforcement of shari’ah laws in Pakistan. Id. at 854–61. 
However, it hardly needs saying that one village in Central Punjab is not a representative 
sample. But cf. JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 18 (arguing that Islamization has 
taken hold in Pakistan “despite the lack of overall popular support” because “the Islamic 
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Hudood laws have come to symbolize to many Western observers the 
perceived retrogressive and discriminatory nature of Islam and Islamic 
laws. In the present geo-political environment characterized by the 
“Clash of Civilizations” and the “War on Terror,” the Hudood laws ap-
pear to highlight the dangers associated with the rise of Islamic funda-
mentalism.19 
A major reason for the failure of anti-Hudood activists to win wide-
spread public support has been an inability, or perhaps a conscious deci-
sion on their part, to effectively and credibly challenge the fidelity of 
these laws to their Islamic doctrinal foundations.20 Further, a bulk of the 
critique has focused on the language and the structure of the Hudood Or-
dinances and their misapplication in the trial courts.21 Inadequate atten-
tion has been paid thus far to the evolving jurisprudence of the Shariat 
appellate courts, which, compelled by the logic of traditional fiqh (Is-
                                                                                                             
political parties carry a group of dedicated followers, with enough strength, organisation 
and clout to keep all governments from implementing a progressive secular policy”). 
 19. See, e.g., CHERYL BENARD, CIVIL DEMOCRATIC ISLAM: PARTNERS, RESOURCES, 
AND STRATEGIES 17–20 (2003) (discussing the harsh criminal punishments in fundamen-
talist Islamic justice); Joan Fitzpatrick & Alice Miller, International Standards on the 
Death Penalty: Shifting Discourse, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 273, 358–60 (1993) (contend-
ing that the prevalence of capital punishment in Pakistan is owed to the influence of Is-
lamic fundamentalism). 
 20. In 2002, the National Commission on the Status of Women (“NCSW”) formed a 
fifteen-member Special Committee to review the Hudood Ordinances. The Committee 
held five meetings and recommended, by a sizable majority, that the Ordinances be re-
pealed. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT ON HUDOOD ORDINANCES 
1979 13–14 (2003) [hereinafter NCSW Report]. The NCSW Report, while refreshing the 
controversy, has added very little to the academic debate. It merely summarizes the di-
verse opinions expressed at the meetings, which, for the most part, are regurgitations of 
standard arguments. The superficiality of the analysis conducted in the NCSW Report is 
reflected most clearly in its discussions on the question of rajm, which the Report ac-
knowledged required detailed study, yet with little hesitation recommended its repeal. See 
id. at 13–14, 36–38. Thus far, no action has been taken in pursuance of the NCSW Re-
port. Like earlier efforts from the Commission of Inquiry for Women, the NCSW Report 
is likely to be ignored. See THE COMM’N OF INQUIRY FOR WOMEN, REPORT OF THE 
COMM’N OF INQUIRY FOR WOMEN (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter CIW Report]. In 1997, that 
commission had also recommended repeal of the Hudood laws after finding, without a 
thorough investigation, the laws to be “not in conformity with injunctions of Islam.”  Id. 
at 75. However, this report had done a much better job than the NCSW Report as far as 
documenting the problems associated with the enforcement of the Hudood laws. 
 21. See JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 85–130, for a work representative of this 
approach. Jahangir and Jilani’s book contains extensive analysis of trial cases in which 
the Sessions courts have made glaring errors. Problem decisions handed down by the 
FSC have also been highlighted. However, the book makes only passing references to 
those FSC cases overturning Sessions courts’ decisions or overruling problematic FSC 
decisions, and it offers no analysis whatsoever of the FSC’s jurisprudence. 
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lamic jurisprudence) doctrines, have managed to shape the substantive 
laws in a manner that appears to alleviate many of the criticisms directed 
against these laws.22 This lack of attention towards the role of the Shariat 
courts in shaping the Hudood laws may be attributable to a general per-
ception amongst the critics that the Shariat courts espouse an essentially 
conservative ideology in consonance with the proponents of the Hudood 
laws. This perception, which is rooted in the political origins and the 
early history of the Shariat courts,23 does not fully accord with the recent 
practice or the present jurisprudential approach of the Shariat courts in 
Pakistan.24 
                                                                                                             
 22. Amira Sonbol contends that inattention to the practice of shari’ah courts in gen-
eral is pervasive in Western scholarship of Islamic law. Amira Sonbol, Women in 
Shari’ah Courts: A Historical and Methodological Discussion, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
225 (2003). Studying the practice of pre-modern shari’ah courts in Egypt, Sonbol discov-
ers that the legal precedents of these courts protected the rights of women to a greater 
extent than many of the religious and secular codes in force today. Id. at 252. She con-
cludes that “ideological presumptions,” along with a lack of research, has led to the al-
most total disregard for the “legal practices accumulated over the centuries which had 
constituted a common law” in Islamic societies. Id. 
 23. The establishment of the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of 
the Supreme Court generated substantial criticism on various constitutional grounds. See 
generally Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, supra note 2, at 66–67. 
First, in establishing these “Islamic” courts, the President amended Pakistan’s Constitu-
tion in the absence of Parliament. Second, the President’s power of appointment of ulema 
judges to the judiciary gave rise to the concern that the Shariat courts would adopt the 
orthodox positions on interpretations of Islamic law espoused by a segment of the society 
that formed a numerically insignificant portion of the electorate. Having the power to 
overrule any legislation enacted by future democratically elected Parliaments, the Shariat 
courts, it was feared, would impose the views of this minority over those of the majority. 
Third, the creation of the Shariat courts appeared to undermine further the idea that the 
judiciary was an independent branch of Pakistani government. 
 24. See Julie Dror Chadbourne, Never Wear Your Shoes After Midnight: Legal Trends 
Under the Pakistan Zina Ordinance, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 179, 181 (1999) (“[W]hile the 
body of law relating to the Zina Ordinance is varied, the Pakistani judiciary is developing 
case law that may assist future advocates . . . in their efforts on behalf of their clients.”). 
In fact, it has been argued that the FSC has always played less of a demonic role than has 
been attributed to it by its critics. See Charles H. Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan: 
Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, 28 ASIAN SURV. 307 (1988) [hereinafter 
Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan]. In a statistical review of the jurisprudence of the 
FSC from 1980 to 1984, Charles Kennedy found that the FSC “accepts or partially ac-
cepts an extraordinarily high percentage of the appeals before it . . . [and] that the FSC 
‘upheld fully’ only 19% of the convictions brought before it and that it acquitted 52% of 
the appellates.” Id. at 309. Kennedy also found that over ninety percent of the cases over-
turned by the FSC were reversed “because of misappreciation of facts, not misinterpreta-
tion of law, . . . [and that] even in cases in which it upheld the conviction of the sessions 
judge, the FSC was more lenient in its sentencing.” Id. at 309–10. Accordingly, Kennedy 
concluded that the “the net effect of FSC decisions . . . has been to moderate substantially 
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This paper will survey the contours of the controversies surrounding 
the Hudood laws and seek to identify the extent to which the divergent 
perceptions accord with the reality. The aim is to broaden the horizons of 
the debate surrounding the Hudood laws by incorporating an “Islamic 
critique,” something that has generally been lacking in the discourse. 
More importantly, the paper seeks to analyze the role that the FSC has 
played in substantively shaping the law, indicating thereby that Islamic 
critiques may offer a viable avenue for alleviating the hardships perpe-
trated in the application of the Hudood laws. Whereas, it may not be 
practical to undertake a holistic analysis of the FSC’s entire jurispru-
dence at this stage, this paper will put forward a chronological analysis 
of the Court’s decisions on one―arguably the most contentious―aspect 
of the Hudood laws: the conviction of rape victims for zina (consensual 
adultery/fornication) where the pregnancy caused by the rape is regarded 
as proof of the crime. Criticisms of this scenario have been repeated per-
sistently in both international and domestic news media, and have even 
become cliché in most academic critiques of the Hudood laws.25 Most 
such critiques, however, offer little or no analysis of the relevant juris-
prudence of the Shariat courts. 
Part II of the paper will provide an overview of the provisions of the 
“Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979” (Zina Or-
dinance), and outline the circumstances in which some trial courts have 
considered pregnancy as proof of zina in cases prosecuted under the Or-
dinance. Part III of the paper shall present a review of the jurisprudence 
of the FSC, indicating the extent to which the Court has addressed the 
criticisms engendered by the consideration of pregnancy as proof of 
zina.26 Part IV will then highlight the principal arguments presented by 
both the proponents and opponents of the Hudood laws, and analyze the 
major disagreements in their approaches. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that this debate has reached a stalemate primarily because it fails to in-
corporate a vital dimension: a thorough and credible Islamic critique, 
                                                                                                             
the zeal of the sessions judges in enforcing the Hudood statutes.” Id. at 310. Kennedy 
attributes this moderation to the typical composition of the Shariat courts and the back-
ground of the judges. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, supra note 2, 
at 65–66. Whereas the critics complain about the presence of ulema judges on the bench, 
Kennedy points out that eighteen of the twenty-three judges appointed to serve on the 
FSC between 1980 and 1989 were former High Court judges, and that twenty possessed 
Western-style law degrees. Id. at 66. 
 25. See, e.g., JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 86–87; Weiss, supra note 2, at 870. 
 26. This part of the paper will incorporate detailed excerpts from the relevant judg-
ments, many of which have been written in grammatically or stylistically deficient Eng-
lish. No attempt has been made to revise the language since it is important to let the 
judges, under scrutiny, speak for themselves. 
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evaluating the extent to which the Hudood laws, as presently enforced in 
Pakistan, accord with the traditional fiqh doctrines upon which they are 
supposedly founded. The paper shall also advance the argument that the 
positive developments in the jurisprudence of the FSC are not merely 
attributable to the political pressures generated by the opponents of the 
Hudood laws or to international media attention. Rather, it will be shown 
that the categorical imperatives embedded in the Islamic fiqh doctrines at 
the foundations of the Hudood laws necessitate many of the positions 
taken by the Court. Proposals for reform and a conclusion will follow. 
II. THE ZINA ORDINANCE 
A. Overview 
It is said that the Zina Ordinance introduced the sexual offenses of zina 
and zina-bil-jabr (rape) into Pakistan’s criminal laws.27 Whereas zina 
was a previously unknown offense,28 the zina-bil-jabr provisions of the 
Ordinance replaced pre-existing rape provisions in the Pakistan Penal 
Code.29 However, the FSC has held that the Ordinance represents a 
                                                                                                             
 27. See Offence of Zina Ordinance §§ 4, 6, supra note 1, at 52. Additionally, the Zina 
Ordinance transferred some offenses from the general criminal laws of the Pakistan Penal 
Code to the Hudood laws, or created new offenses similar to those already existing. See, 
e.g., id. § 12, at 54 (prohibiting “[k]idnapping or abducting in order to subject person to 
unnatural lust”); id. § 14, at 54 (prohibiting “[b]uying person for purposes of prostitu-
tion”); id. § 15, at 55 (prohibiting “[c]ohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a 
belief of marriage”); id. § 16, at 55 (prohibiting “[e]nticing or taking away or detaining 
with criminal intent a woman”). 
 28. While zina was a previously unknown offense, adultery was already punishable 
under the Pakistan Penal Code. The penal code provided: 
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or 
has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or con-
nivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of 
rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprison-
ment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with 
fine, or with both. In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor. 
PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 20, § 497 (1860) (repealed by Zina Ordinance). Adultery, prior to the 
Zina Ordinance, was thus an offense that could only be committed by a man. Fornication, 
or consensual sexual intercourse between unmarried persons, was not an offense prior to 
the enforcement of the Zina Ordinance. 
 29. See PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16-A, §§ 375–376 (1860), repealed by Offence of Zina 
Ordinance § 3, supra note 1, at 52. 
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“complete departure” from the previous law.30 Accordingly, “no offence 
by the name of rape exists in the corpus juris of Pakistan” any longer.31 
Section 4 of the Ordinance defines the offense of zina as willful sexual 
intercourse between a man and a woman who are not validly married to 
each other.32 Zina is liable to the punishment of hadd (punishment or-
dained by the Qur’an)33 if the following proof is presented to the Ses-
sions Court (the trial court): the accused confesses to the commission of 
zina before the court, or the prosecution presents four credible adult male 
Muslim eyewitnesses who have seen the very act of penetration.34 The 
                                                                                                             
 30. Muhammad Asghar v. State, 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. 1, 5 (1984). 
 31. Muhammad Hayat v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Faisalabad, 2002 Y.L.R. 23, 24 
(Lahore High Ct. 2001). 
 32. Section 4 of the Zina Ordinance provides: 
4. Zina.–A man and a woman are said to commit ‘zina’ if they willfully have 
sexual intercourse without being validly married to each other. 
Explanation.–Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse nec-
essary to the offence of zina. 
Offence of Zina Ordinance § 4, supra note 1, at 52. 
 33. Hudood are generally defined as those crimes for which punishment has been 
fixed by divine commandment. Though this definition is uniformly adhered to by the 
ulema, the catalogue of the Hudood crimes in fact varies. As such, some consider only 
those crimes to be Hudood which have been mentioned in the Qur’an and for which the 
punishment has been explicitly prescribed therein. Others include those crimes that, 
though mentioned in the Qur’an, punishment is not explicitly provided. For example, the 
consumption of alcohol is forbidden by the Qur’an, but it provides no punishment. Yet, a 
majority of the ulema consider this to be a hadd offense and derive its punishment from 
the Sunnah. A third category of ulema point out that there is no distinction between hadd 
and tazir in the Sunnah, and consider all those crimes which are referenced in the Qur’an 
or the Sunnah to be hadd crimes. There are only four crimes that have been explicitly 
mentioned in the Qur’an: zina, haraabah (variously defined as highway robbery, forcible 
taking of property, or waging war against the state); shurb al-khamr (consumption of 
wine); and qazf (unwarranted accusation of zina). Of these, the punishment for shurb al-
khamr is not mentioned in the Qur’an. Verse 5:33 of the Qur’an, which deals with haraa-
bah, mentions four possible punishments for this category of crimes: taqteel (execution), 
tasleeb (crucifixion), amputation of a hand and the opposite foot, or exile. As regards 
zina, although the Qur’an expressly mentions the punishment of one hundred lashes in 
verse 24:02, a majority of the ulema have relied on certain ahadith (narrations on what 
the Prophet Muhammad approved) to establish rajm as the appropriate hadd punishment. 
See Hazoor Bakhsh v. Federation of Pakistan, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. 145, 153 (1981) 
(Durrani, J., dissenting) (“No doubt the punishment for a married woman . . . is stoning to 
death as against [an] unmarried one who is to be given 100 lashes.”). 
 34. Section 8 of the Zina Ordinance, which establishes the proof requirements, pro-
vides: 
8. Proof of zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd.–Proof of Zina or zina-bil-jabr, 
liable to hadd shall be in one of the following forms, namely:– 
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hadd punishment for zina committed by a man or woman who is, or has 
previously been, married and has had sexual intercourse in the course of 
that marriage is rajm.35 The hadd punishment for zina committed by a 
                                                                                                             
(a) the accused makes before a Court of competent jurisdiction a confession of 
the commission of the offence; or 
(b) at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the Court is satis-
fied, having regard to the requirements of tazkiyah al-shuhood, that they are 
truthful persons and abstain from major sins (kabair), give evidence as eye-
witnesses of the act of penetration necessary to the offence. Provided that, if the 
accused is a non-Muslim, the eye-witnesses may be non-Muslims. 
Explanation. In this section “tazkiyah al-shuhood” means the mode of inquiry 
adopted by a Court to satisfy itself as to the credibility of a witness. 
Offence of Zina Ordinance § 8, supra note 1, at 53. The FSC has consistently interpreted 
the confession requirement of subsection (a) to mean confessions freely given before the 
Sessions Court on four different occasions. Confessions made to the police or to a Magis-
trate in pre-trial proceedings do not fulfill this requirement. See, e.g., Zafran Bibi v. State, 
54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. 1, 14 (2002). The requirement of four Muslim adult male wit-
nesses has been derived from the following Qur’anic injunction: 
 
If any of your women Are guilty of lewdness, Take the evidence of four (reliable) 
witnesses from amongst you Against them; and if they testify, Confine them to 
houses until Death do claim them, Or God ordain for them Some (other) way. 
 
Qur’an 4:15 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., The Islamic Center 3d ed. 1938). 
 35. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 5(2)(a), supra note 1, at 52. The distinction between 
adultery and fornication has proven to be one of the most debated aspects of the Zina 
Ordinance. The Qur’anic injunction in verse 4:15 has been widely understood to antedate 
verse 24:2, the only prescription in the Qur’an of a specific punishment for adultery and 
fornication: 
 
The woman and the man Guilty of adultery or fornication, Flog each of them With a 
hundred stripes: Let not compassion move you In their case, in a matter Prescribed 
by God, if ye believe In God and the Last Day: And let a party Of the Believers 
Witness their punishment. 
 
Qur’an 4:15 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., The Islamic Center 3d ed. 1938). Verse 24:2 
betrays no distinction between adultery and fornication and prescribes only one punish-
ment for both offenses, one-hundred lashes in public. A majority of the Justices sitting on 
the FSC panel in Hazoor Bakhsh seized upon this verse to declare rajm un-Islamic. See 
Hazoor Bakhsh, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. at 147 (Ali Hyder, J., concurring) (“[S]toning to 
death . . . is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam.”). This decision resulted in significant 
embarrassment to the military regime of General Zia, which immediately amended the 
Constitution to grant the FSC the power to review its own judgments. JAHANGIR & 
JILANI, supra note 2, at 29. In 1982, the review petition was heard by a wholly reconsti-
tuted FSC: the three judges who had formed the Hazoor Bakhsh majority had since been 
removed, and the one dissenting judge, who had opined that rajm is a valid Islamic hadd 
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man or woman who is neither married, nor previously been married, is 
public whipping of one-hundred lashes.36 A sentence of hadd may only 
be executed if the FSC has confirmed it after a hearing, regardless of 
whether or not the defendant has filed an appeal.37 
Section 6 of the Ordinance defines zina-bil-jabr as the act of having 
non-consensual sexual intercourse with a man or woman with whom the 
accused is not validly married.38 Zina-bil-jabr is committed when the 
accused has had intercourse either: (a) against the victim’s will; (b) with-
out the victim’s consent; (c) after obtaining the victim’s consent by du-
ress; or (d) after obtaining the victim’s consent by inducing a fraudulent 
belief of a valid marriage.39 Zina-bil-jabr is liable to hadd punishment if 
proof according to Section 8 of the Ordinance is presented before the 
Court.40 The hadd punishment for zina-bil-jabr committed by a man who 
is, or has previously been, married and has had sexual intercourse in the 
course of that marriage is rajm.41 The hadd punishment for zina-bil-jabr 
committed by a man who is not, and has never previously been, married 
is public whipping of one-hundred lashes, as well as any other punish-
ment, including a death sentence, that the court may consider appropriate 
                                                                                                             
punishment, had died by the time the review petition was heard. This reconstituted FSC 
unanimously held that rajm was not repugnant to Islam. Id. at 29–30. 
 36. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 5(2)(b), supra note 1, at 52. 
 37. Id. § 5(3). 
 38. Id. § 6. Section 6(1) of the Zina Ordinance makes it clear that a woman can be 
accused of committing zina-bil-jabr against a man, or possibly even a woman. Contrast 
this with the repealed rape provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, which defined rape as 
the commission of sexual intercourse “with a woman . . . [a]gainst her will . . . [or 
w]ithout her consent.” PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16-A, § 375 (1860) (repealed by Zina Ordi-
nance). Other than the gender-neutrality of its language, section 6 of the Zina Ordinance 
mimics the repealed rape provisions. This gender-neutrality is somewhat perplexing since 
penetration is a requirement for criminal liability. See Offence of Zina Ordinance §4, 
supra note 1, at 52 (“Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse neces-
sary to the offence of ‘zina-bil-Jabr’.”). It is, therefore, hard to conceive of a situation in 
which a woman may commit zina-bil-jabr with a man or another woman. Additionally, 
note that the section 6 definition of zina-bil-jabr excludes marital rape from its prohibi-
tion. See id. §6(1) (providing that the zina-bil-jabr prohibition applies only to those per-
sons “not validly married”). This is a point of divergence between the Zina Ordinance 
and the repealed Pakistan Penal Code provisions, which provided for a punishment of up 
to two years imprisonment. PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16-A, § 376 (1860) (repealed by Zina 
Ordinance). 
 39. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 6(1), supra note 1, at 52. 
 40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 41. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 6(3)(a), supra note 1, at 53. 
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having regard to the circumstances of the case.42 As with sentences of 
hadd for convictions of zina, sentences of hadd for convictions of zina-
bil-jabr cannot be executed unless they are confirmed by the FSC.43 
If the proof required for hadd punishment is not available, a court may 
still convict the accused of either zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir (dis-
cretionary punishment under the Zina Ordinance) where other direct or 
circumstantial evidence of the commission of the offense is available.44 
The maximum tazir punishment for zina is rigorous imprisonment of ten 
years.45 The tazir punishment for zina-bil-jabr is rigorous imprisonment 
of four to twenty-five years.46 In cases of zina-bil-jabr committed by a 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. § 6(3)(b). Note that this is the same punishment that the Qu’ran prescribes for 
zina in verse 24:2. See supra note 35. The Qu’ran does not explicitly take cognizance of, 
or prescribe punishment for, rape. 
 43. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 6(4), supra note 1, at 53. 
 44. As opposed to hadd punishments, tazir punishments are not statutorily fixed and 
may be left to the discretion of the judge. Compare id. § 5(2), at 52 (detailing punishment 
for zina liable to hadd), and id. § 6(3), at 53 (detailing punishment for zina-bil-jabr liable 
to hadd), with id. §§ 10(2), 10(3), at 54 (detailing punishments for zina and zina-bil-jabr 
liable to tazir). 
 45. Id. § 10(2), at 54. Asifa Quraishi has questioned the very logic of awarding tazir 
punishments for zina. Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws 
of Pakistan from a Woman Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287, 313 (1997). 
She points out that punishment for zina as hadd requires the eyewitness testimony of four 
individuals, because the crime is prosecutable by the state only when it is a public act of 
indecency. Id. at 311–13. At the same time, the Qu’ran strictly forbids qazf, or unsubstan-
tiated accusations of zina. When an allegation of zina is made and four eyewitnesses are 
not forthcoming, the Qu’ran declares: 
And those who launch A charge against chaste women, And produce not four 
witnesses (to support their allegations), ― Flog them with eighty stripes; And 
reject their evidence Ever after: for such men Are wicked transgressors; ― 
Unless they repent thereafter And mend (their conduct); For God is Oft-
Forgiving, Most Merciful. 
Qu’ran 24:4. Therefore, Quraishi argues, the Qu’ran forbids prosecution for zina as tazir, 
since such charges are invariably brought only when four eyewitnesses are not available. 
Quraishi, supra, at 312. In such circumstances, she continues, the only offense that 
should be prosecuted is the qazf committed by the complainant. See id. at 299. 
 46. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 10(3), supra note 1, at 54. Sections 10(2) and 10(3) 
of the Zina Ordinance had prescribed a sentence of whipping of up to thirty lashes in 
addition to imprisonment for tazir offenses. However, the Abolition of the Punishment of 
Whipping Act, 1996 (VII of 1996) eliminated whipping as a punishment for all offenses, 
including tazir, other than those “where the punishment of whipping is provided for as 
hadd.” See, e.g., Abdul Razzaque v. State, 2003 P.Cr.L.J. 1256 (Lahore High Ct. 2002) 
(setting aside the whipping portion of the petitioner’s sentence for zina-bil-jabr liable to 
tazir). 
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gang of two or more people, the tazir punishment is a mandatory death 
sentence.47 
B. Pregnancy as Proof of Guilt 
One of the primary criticisms leveled against the Zina Ordinance is that 
it results in the equation of rape with consensual adultery/fornication 
such that when a victim of rape is unable to prove that she had been sub-
jected to non-consensual intercourse, she herself stands accused of hav-
ing committed zina and is convicted and punished for that offense. This 
criticism is indeed founded in the stark reality of the Pakistani criminal 
justice system. There have been many cases where women allege the 
commission of zina-bil-jabr against them, but the police, taking into con-
sideration the pregnancy caused by the alleged rape and the delay in 
bringing the complaint, treat their case as one of zina instead.48 In a few 
of these cases, the Sessions Courts acquitted the accused rapists for lack 
of sufficient evidence against them, yet nonetheless convicted the female 
victims for the offense of zina, regarding as proof the pregnancy caused 
by the alleged rape. The circular argument adopted by the Sessions 
Courts in these cases is that extra-marital pregnancy amounts to proof 
that an act of sexual intercourse occurred, and since the woman has 
failed to prove the rape, through the absence of consent or otherwise, the 
sexual intercourse is therefore consensual and amounts to zina.49 Even 
                                                                                                             
 47. Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) (Amendment) Act (VI of 1997) 
(amending the Zina Ordinance to provide this punishment through the addition of a new 
section, § 10(4)). 
 48. The role of the police in rape cases has been subject to severe criticism. The po-
lice in Pakistan are notorious for ill-treatment of rape victims and in many cases refuse to 
file charges. Police officials have also been accused of committing rape on women in 
their custody. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIME OR CUSTOM?: VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN IN PAKISTAN 45–47, 52–64 (2001). For recommendations on reform of 
police practice and rules, see id. at 10–11.    
 49. This represents a misunderstanding of the burden of proof in criminal cases. In 
order to convict an accused, the prosecution has to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
that the accused committed the crime. See, e.g., 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1308 (2006). In 
contrast, in order to win a civil case, a party has to prove that it is more likely than not 
that its claim is true. See, e.g., 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1311 (2006). Therefore, one might 
legitimately say that in order to win a civil case a party has to bring sufficient evidence to 
show that the probability of its version of the events being true is more than fifty percent. 
On the other hand, it is not possible to assign a numerical value to the burden of proof in 
criminal cases. For example, when a trial judge in the United States instructed a jury that 
the standard of proof could be viewed as “seven and a half, if you had to put it on a scale” 
of ten, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed on appeal stating: “The concept of reasonable 
doubt is inherently qualitative. Any attempt to quantify it may impermissibly lower the 
prosecution’s burden of proof.” McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983). 
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those rape victims who ultimately escape conviction for zina end up suf-
fering significant imprisonment prior to and during trial, and are sub-
jected to unnecessary stigma, humiliation, and pain.50 
In most jurisdictions, rape and other sexual crimes are usually exceed-
ingly hard to prove. For example, these crimes are often committed in 
private, so invariably the victim’s word is pitted against that of the ac-
cused.51 Given that conviction for a crime, especially one as serious as 
rape, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, courts require the prose-
cution to adduce significant medical or other circumstantial evidence in 
corroboration of the victim’s testimony.52 In Pakistan, the possibility of 
credible medical evidence being available to a criminal court is minimal. 
When a victim alleges rape, the normal practice is to present the victim 
for a medical examination at a government hospital. In most cases, the 
medical examination reveals only limited evidence: (a) whether sexual 
intercourse has recently taken place as indicated by the presence of se-
men in the vagina; (b) whether the victim has been having sexual inter-
course in the past; and (c) whether the victim has become pregnant.53 
Medical techniques which may identify the perpetrator, such as DNA 
testing of semen or paternity testing, have become widely available to the 
police and prosecution in most Western jurisdictions, but still remain 
unavailable in Pakistan except in the most high profile cases.54 
                                                                                                             
Nonetheless, should the prosecution fail to secure a conviction because it only managed 
to prove that its version of the facts was seventy-five percent probable, it may still be 
possible to hold that it is more likely than not that the prosecution is telling the truth. For 
example, whereas O.J. Simpson was found not guilty of murder at his criminal trial, he 
was, nonetheless, found liable at the subsequent civil trial. See Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 492, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). By the same logic, if a victim brings a charge of 
zina-bil-jabr but fails to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, she may still be telling the 
truth. As such, there is no reason to assume if she has fails to prove zina-bil-jabr, then she 
must have committed zina. Treating zina and zina-bil-jabr as either/or offenses represents 
a logical fallacy. 
 50. See Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 217–29. 
 51. See Tiffany Bohn, Yes, Then No, Means No: Current Issues, Trends, and Prob-
lems in Post-Penetration Rape, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 151, 173–75 (2004) (noting that a 
problem of proof in rape cases is conflicting testimony of the victim and the accused). 
 52. JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 13. But see 75 C.J.S. Rape § 94 (2006) 
(“Corroboration of a victim’s testimony in sexual offense cases is triggered only by con-
tradictions in the victim’s trial testimony.”). 
 53. See Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 235–60 (describing the uses and limits of 
medical evidence in Zina Ordinance cases). 
 54. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 47–49, 64–95 (detailing the lack of 
“medicolegal” capabilities and facilities in Pakistan). For recommendations on reform of 
Pakistan’s medicolegal system, see id. at 11–14. 
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Given Pakistan’s conservative social environment, with its stigma at-
tachments and concerns regarding family honor such that “honor killing” 
is even a possibility, victims in most rape cases do not lodge complaints 
with the police.55 In cases where a complaint is filed, it is usually after 
long and careful deliberation by the family of the accused. In many 
cases, the rape is only reported after the victim becomes aware of her 
pregnancy and realizes that she has no choice but to complain. In such 
situations, the rudimentary medical examinations conducted are not 
likely to produce any helpful evidence. In fact, the medical evidence in 
most cases makes the victim’s position even more precarious, since it is 
assumed that she is making an accusation of rape only to excuse her il-
licit conduct. Thus, in choosing between reporting and silence, rape vic-
tims often find themselves in a lose-lose situation. 
III. THE CASES 
There have been at least eight reported cases in which the FSC has ex-
plicitly dealt with the question of whether pregnancy can be considered 
sufficient proof of zina in the absence of any other evidence. A chrono-
logical analysis of these cases, revealing the progressive development of 
the Court’s views on this narrow issue, as well as the laws pertaining to 
zina and zina-bil-jabr generally, is as follows: 
A. Sakina v. State (1981)56 
Sakina and Wali Dad were married to each other at the time of their ar-
rest for commission of zina. The prosecution, based on the First Informa-
tion Report (F.I.R.)57 lodged by Sakina’s brother, alleged that Sakina and 
Wali Dad had had an illicit relationship prior to their marriage. At the 
time of her arrest, Sakina, according to the medical examiner, had been 
pregnant for thirty-two weeks even though less than eighteen weeks had 
elapsed since her marriage to Wali Dad. Sakina’s explanation for her pre-
marital pregnancy was that it might have been the result of sexual acts 
she had been forced to engage in with certain visitors by her family. The 
Sessions Court disbelieved her, convicted both she and Wali Dad for zina 
                                                                                                             
 55. See Manar Waheed, Note, Domestic Violence in Pakistan: The Tension Between 
Intervention & Sovereign Autonomy in Human Rights Law, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 
944–46 (2004) (describing the practice of honor killing in Pakistan). 
 56. 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. 320 (1981). 
 57. The F.I.R. is the formal complaint of an offense lodged with the police. The F.I.R. 
is the pivotal document in Pakistani criminal prosecutions. Judges, both trial and appel-
late, frequently test the veracity of the prosecution’s evidence by comparing it to the ver-
sion of the events alleged in the F.I.R. 
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liable to tazir, and sentenced them each to four years of rigorous impris-
onment and thirty-three lashes.58 
In a brief judgment, a full bench of the FSC overturned both convic-
tions. As regards Wali Dad, the Court found no credible evidence against 
him.59 In Sakina’s case, the Court stated: 
In these circumstances we have no material on record to enable us to 
hold that Mst. Sakina had been committing sexual intercourse with oth-
ers willingly. In the absence of proof of her consent she cannot be held 
to have committed the offence of Zina.60 
As such, the Court affirmed a cardinal principle of criminal law, that 
the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt is on the prosecution.61 Until the prosecution satisfies that burden, 
the accused has no case to answer. 
A woman’s consent is an essential element for any conviction for the 
crime of zina.62 This element has to be categorically proven by the prose-
cution, and cannot merely be inferred from the accused’s pregnancy or 
other surrounding circumstances. Here, the Sessions Court had treated 
the question of consent as if the absence of consent is a defense that the 
accused has to establish to the court’s satisfaction. This shifted the bur-
den of proof to the accused. The FSC rightly corrected that error. 
B. Jehan Mina v. State (1983)63 
Jehan Mina was hardly sixteen at the time of her arrest. She was ap-
proximately five to six months pregnant, and claimed that her uncle and 
cousin had raped her while she was visiting their home to look after a 
sick aunt.64 At the time of the discovery of her pregnancy, Jehan Mina 
was living with another uncle, Noor Said. Allegedly, Jehan Mina’s 
grandfather, her legal guardian, demanded that Noor Said hand Jehan 
Mina over to his custody so that he might kill her in order to preserve the 
family’s honor. Noor Said refused his family’s pressure, and lodged an 
F.I.R. with the police. Instead of initiating an investigation of zina-bil-
jabr, the police made Jehan Mina a co-accused in a case of zina. The Ses-
sions Court trying the case acquitted both of the accused males on the 
                                                                                                             
 58. Sakina, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. at 321. 
 59. Id. at 322. 
 60. Id. at 323. 
 61. See supra note 49. 
 62. See Offence of Zina Ordinance § 4, supra note 1, at 52 (requiring persons to 
“willfully have sexual intercourse” for conviction). 
 63. 35 P.L.D. 1983 F.S.C. 183 (1983). 
 64. Id. at 184. 
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grounds that they could not be convicted merely on the basis of Jehan 
Mina’s statement.65 However, the court convicted Jehan Mina for zina 
liable to hadd, and imposed a punishment of one hundred lashes. 
The FSC upheld Jehan Mina’s conviction on appeal, but reduced her 
offense from zina liable to hadd to zina liable to tazir. Taking into con-
sideration her “tender age” and the fact that she had been deprived of the 
“benefit of paternal affection,” the Court reduced her sentence to three 
years rigorous imprisonment and ten lashes.66 The Court provided the 
following rationale in justification of its decision: “[T]he basis of the 
conviction is her unexplained pregnancy coupled with the fact that she is 
not a married girl.”67 The Court added that since Jehan Mina had kept 
quiet for over five months, it was “difficult to believe her statement that 
zina-bil-jabr had been committed with her.”68 The Court also found it 
important that “she had the opportunity of complaining to her grandfa-
ther but . . . never did so.”69 
Given that her grandfather had expressed a serious intent to kill her in 
order to preserve the family honor, how valid was the Court’s reasoning? 
This case has been widely criticized and cited as a representative exam-
ple of the gross injustices perpetrated under the Hudood laws.70 Accord-
ing to one women’s rights campaigner: 
Apart from the injustice that Jehan Mina suffered from society and the 
system of justice, the case had serious future implications for victims of 
rape resulting in pregnancy. While rapists would have to be proved 
guilty, victims would be presumed guilty and the burden would be on 
them to prove their innocence.71 
The legal reasoning employed by the FSC in this judgment clearly con-
flicted with that in Sakina. The Court in Jehan Mina appeared to have 
forgotten the fundamental principles of criminal liability outlined in its 
own precedent. Further, the purpose of the creation of an independent 
FSC with three ulema on its bench was to decide cases according to the 
Islamic injunctions laid down in the Qu’ran and Sunnah.72 In this case, 
the Court based its decision exclusively on misapplied common law 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. at 186. 
 66. Id. at 188. 
 67. Id. at 187. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., SHAHLA ZIA, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & THEIR QUEST FOR JUSTICE 
81 (2002). 
 71. Id. But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 40 (“Such cases are far less 
frequent in the late 1990s than they were in the 1980s.”).   
 72. See supra note 8. 
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principles of criminal liability and evidence, without even once referring 
to Islamic principles of liability. 
C. Siani v. State (1984)73 
The Siani case arose from the discovery of a stillborn fetus in a resi-
dential area. The prosecution alleged that Siani, wife of Pahalwan, had 
engaged in unlawful sexual intercourse with her co-accused, Ghulam 
Najaf, prior to her marriage, and that this relationship resulted in her 
pregnancy. The prosecution further charged that in order to conceal her 
zina and the resulting pregnancy, Siani had caused herself to miscarry 
and had disposed of the aborted fetus.74 The Sessions Court acquitted her 
male co-accused, finding no evidence against him. The only evidence 
against Siani was the report of the medical examiner, who had opined 
that Siani showed signs of recent pregnancy and had probably miscarried 
around the time of the discovery of the dead fetus.75 This was sufficient 
proof for the Sessions Court, which convicted Siani of the offense of zina 
liable to tazir under Section 10 of the Zina Ordinance and sentenced her 
to five years rigorous imprisonment and thirty lashes. 
A single bench of the FSC, composed solely of Justice Muhammad 
Siddiq, overturned Siani’s conviction on appeal, holding that medical 
evidence of pregnancy alone cannot form the basis of a criminal convic-
tion.76 The Court, affirming the stance adopted in Sakina, and without 
referring to Jehan Mina, made the following comment: 
This Court has already said in several cases that a mere preg-
nancy/abortion or birth of an illegal child of an unmarried girl/widow 
or a married woman whose husband has no access to her during the 
relevant period, could not be sufficient to prove her guilty under section 
10 of the Ordinance unless it is further proved by the prosecution that 
she was a consenting party for the said Zina resulting in her conception 
and then in abortion.77 
Unlike the accused in Sakina, Siani had not alleged that she had been 
subjected to zina-bil-jabr. In fact, she completely denied that she had 
ever had sexual intercourse prior to her marriage, or that she had miscar-
ried. In this regard, Siani better illustrates the principle already stated: 
that the burden is squarely upon the prosecution to prove all of the ele-
ments of the offense, consent of the woman being the most essential. 
                                                                                                             
 73. 36 P.L.D. 1984 F.S.C. 121 (1984). 
 74. Id. at 123. 
 75. Id. at 123–24. 
 76. Id. at 126. 
 77. Id. 
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The Court in Siani considered the status of medical evidence in the fol-
lowing terms: 
In the instant case it is an admitted fact that there is no other direct or 
positive evidence produced by the prosecution to substantiate the 
charge . . . against Mst. Siani appellant. In addition to the medical evi-
dence the prosecution should have produced some other direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence to connect the appellant with the offence 
charged.78 
This pronouncement makes clear that in order to secure a conviction, the 
prosecution has to prove all the elements of the offense through credible 
direct or circumstantial evidence, including the fact that the accused 
“was a consenting party for the commission of sexual intercourse.”79 
Medical evidence of pregnancy, and by logical extension, pregnancy it-
self, can only provide “a piece of independent corroboration.”80 Thus, the 
Court unambiguously declared that pregnancy, by itself, cannot form the 
basis for a conviction.81 
D. Rafaqat Bibi v. State (1984)82 
Rafaqat Bibi filed a complaint of zina-bil-jabr against Muhammad 
Suleman. However, when the medical examiner found her to be eight 
months pregnant, the police instead charged both of them with zina. The 
Sessions Court convicted Rafaqat Bibi for zina liable to tazir, and sen-
tenced her to five years rigorous imprisonment and five lashes. The 
court, however, acquitted Suleman.83 
A single bench of the FSC overturned the conviction. The Court stated 
that though Rafaqat Bibi was in the ninth month of her pregnancy at the 
time of the examination: 
[T]he aforesaid evidence cannot be considered sufficient to convict the 
appellant for commission of offence of zina which has been defined in 
section 4 of the Ordinance, and inter alia involves willfully having sex-
ual intercourse. In the instant case according to the appellant there was 
no willful participation in the sexual intercourse by her as Muhammad 
Suleman committed zina-bil-jabr with her.84 
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 82. N.L.R. 1984 S.D. 165 (F.S.C. 1984). 
 83. Id. at 166. 
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The Court considered relevant the fact that Rafaqat Bibi had filed an 
F.I.R. of her own volition, “wherein she had expressly stated that she had 
been made to submit forcibly to sexual intercourse.”85 The Court did not 
refer to Rafaqat Bibi’s eight-month delay in filing the F.I.R., as if that 
fact were immaterial. 
The Court also dealt with the extent to which an accused’s statement 
may be treated as a partial confession of the fact that sexual intercourse 
took place and answered it in the negative. An affirmative answer to this 
question forms the first vital limb of the irrational reasoning of the erring 
trial courts.86 Citing Safia Bibi v. State with approval,87 the Court said 
that the “[c]onfession should be read as a whole and exculpatory portions 
therein cannot be excluded from consideration unless there is evidence 
on record to prove those portions incorrect.”88 
E. Safia Bibi v. State (decided in 1983, reported in 1985)89 
This case resulted in widespread notoriety of the Hudood laws in the 
national as well as international media.90 Safia Bibi, a twenty-year-old 
girl suffering from acute myopia such that she was nearly blind, was en-
gaged in domestic service at the household of Maqsood Ahmad. She al-
leged that on one occasion, while she was working, Ahmad subjected her 
to zina-bil-jabr.91 According to her testimony, Maqsood Ahmad’s father 
had also raped her on a different occasion, but he was not charged with 
any offense. Succumbing to social and family pressures, Safia Bibi did 
not file a complaint with the police until she could no longer hide her 
pregnancy. The police arrested Safia Bibi and implicated her in a case of 
zina along with Maqsood Ahmad, after her medical examination revealed 
that she had been pregnant and had given birth. At the ensuing trial, the 
Sessions Court acquitted Maqsood Ahmad, but convicted Safia Bibi of 
zina and sentenced her to three years rigorous imprisonment and fifteen 
stripes. 
On appeal, a single bench of the FSC reversed Safia Bibi’s conviction 
for zina. However, the Court affirmed that there was no evidence to con-
vict Maqsood Ahmad of zina-bil-jabr, stating that “[i]t is clear from this 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. 
 86. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 87. Interestingly, the FSC’s decision in Safia Bibi had not yet been reported at this 
time. For a treatment of the case, see infra Part II.E. 
 88. Rafaqat Bibi, N.L.R. 1984 S.D. at 166. 
 89. 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. 120 (1983). 
 90. Id. at 121 (“This is an unfortunate case which received considerable publicity in 
the national and International Press”). 
 91. Id. at 122. 
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evidence that no offence was proved against Maqsood Ahmad as the bare 
statement of his co-accused [Safia Bibi] was not sufficient for his convic-
tion.”92 In its judgment, the Court analyzed the relevant principles of Is-
lamic jurisprudence in some detail and summarized the positions of the 
different schools of fiqh: 
If an unmarried woman delivering a child pleads that the birth was the 
result of commission of the offence of rape on her, she cannot be pun-
ished. This is the view of the Hanafis and the Shafis. But Imam Malik 
said she shall be subjected to Hadd punishment unless she manifested 
the want of consent on her part by raising alarm or by complaining 
against it later.93 
The Court went on to elaborate: 
There is little difference between the view of Imam Malik and others 
on the point of law that rape with a woman absolves her of criminal li-
ability. The only difference is on the point of the evidentiary value of 
the self-exculpatory statement. Imam Malik places the burden of prov-
ing the self-exculpatory evidence on the woman, and this burden can be 
discharged by her by proving that she raised alarm or complained 
against it. She can discharge her burden by production of circumstantial 
evidence . . . .The others, however, consider her statement including the 
self-exculpatory portion thereof as sufficient for absolving her of the 
charge.94 
So, as opposed to the view of Imam Malik, who places the burden of 
disproving consent on the woman, the opinion of the Hanafis and the 
Shafis is that the woman’s statement is sufficient in itself to absolve her 
of all charges. This view is preferable according to the FSC, since it “is 
in conformity with the modern law.”95 
F. Rani v. State (1996)96 
Rani was seven months pregnant when she lodged a complaint of zina-
bil-jabr against her two male co-accused. She claimed that she had re-
frained from filing a complaint because of threats made against her and 
her family by these men until her pregnancy became impossible to hide. 
The Sessions Court acquitted both males because there was no evidence 
against them “except the word and accusations” of Rani. The court, how-
ever, convicted Rani after taking into account her pregnancy and the de-
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 93. Id. at 124. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 125. 
 96. 35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. 150 (F.S.C. 1996). 
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lay in lodging the F.I.R. She was sentenced to two years rigorous impris-
onment and seven lashes.97 
The appeal before the FSC raised all the issues that had arisen in the 
previous cases. In an incisive and articulate judgment, Justice Ghous 
Muhammad reviewed the Court’s earlier case law on the subject. First, 
the Court criticized the decision in Jehan Mina and recommended that it 
be “confined to the annals of legal history.”  That judgment, the Court 
found, was in conflict with established FSC jurisprudence.98 As regards 
the issue of pregnancy being considered as proof of guilt, the Court then 
concluded: 
(i) mere pregnancy is not sufficient to convict a woman for Zina, espe-
cially where she claims the pregnancy to have been caused due to her 
rape/Zina-bil-jabr by man/men who later stand acquitted on any 
ground; 
(ii) to convict a woman for Zina, the prosecution would have to dis-
charge the heavy onus of proof by bringing forth positive and inde-
pendent evidence that the woman actually and in fact had committed 
Zina with her own free will and consent with another man to whom she 
was not lawfully married to. In this regard it may also be stated that 
mere proof of pregnancy or some form of medical testimony/report on 
its own could be of no consequence as the latter would at best only 
serve to be corroborative in nature . . . .99 
Next, on the matter of delay in registering a complaint of zina-bil-jabr, 
usually considered a detriment to the victim’s case, the Court opined: 
On the contrary, this point would fall in favour of the female accused 
i.e. the appellant since she could well forward the plea that the inordi-
nate delay by the prosecution in detecting her pregnancy would entitle 
her to an acquittal on the general principle that any delay in lodging the 
FIR/complaint weakens the case of the prosecution/complainant.100 
Finally, Justice Muhammad stated that: 
[B]y its very nature ‘Zina’ is a joint offence requiring positive identifi-
cation of a man and a woman, distinctly, consenting [to] an unlawful 
sexual intercourse . . . In case any one of them fails to be so identified, 
as has been in the present case, no offence of ‘Zina’ can be made out by 
the prosecution.101 
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Though interesting and persuasive, these arguments are, nonetheless, 
only dicta and as such are not binding on the Court in future cases. 
G. Zafran Bibi v. State (2002)102 
Despite such clear pronouncements of the FSC, history unfortunately 
repeated itself in the case of Zafran Bibi. The case brought to the fore, 
once again, many of the problems associated with the Hudood laws and 
reignited the criticisms. 
On March 26, 2001, Zabta Khan, accompanied by his daughter-in-law 
Zafran Bibi, went to the police station to lodge an F.I.R. Zabta Khan did 
the talking, while Zafran Bibi stood quietly to the side. He claimed that 
about two weeks earlier, while Zafran Bibi had gone to a nearby hill to 
cut fodder, Akmal Khan had assaulted her and committed zina-bil-jabr 
against her. At the time of the incident, Zabta Khan had been away visit-
ing his son, Zafran Bibi’s husband, who was serving a sentence in jail for 
murder. Because Zabta Khan was away, Zafran Bibi took the advice of 
her mother-in-law to wait for his return before deciding whether to report 
to the police.103 
Upon his return, and having heard about the incident, Zabta Khan de-
cided to lodge the F.I.R. At least, this is what he claimed. The police di-
rected Zafran Bibi, as well as Zabta Khan, to thumb-mark the F.I.R., and 
then sent her for a medical examination. The examination revealed that 
she was approximately seven to eight months pregnant.104 Based on the 
discrepancy between the alleged date of the incident and the estimated 
date of conception, the police arraigned Zafran Bibi as a co-accused 
along with Akmal Khan for the offense of zina liable to tazir. 
The trial did not begin until a year later. By then, Zafran Bibi had 
given birth to a baby girl. In a statement recorded before the Magistrate, 
she claimed that Akmal Khan had repeatedly raped her and that she was 
willing to take an oath on the Qu’ran that no one except Akmal Khan had 
committed zina-bil-jabr with her. As the trial proceeded, Zafran Bibi 
changed her stance, contending that, since she was illiterate, she may 
have thumb-marked an incorrect account of the incident to the police at 
the time of lodging the F.I.R. She then made the following statement on 
oath before the trial court: 
Zabta Khan is my father-in-law. I was residing in the house of my hus-
band along with his father. One day he took me to the Police Station  
                                                                                                             
 102. 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. 1 (2002). 
 103. Id. at 8. 
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. . . where he lodged the report. I have not given any statement in police 
station nor lodged any report to the police . . . . In fact Jamal son of 
Zabta Khan has committed Zina forcibly with me and my father-in-law 
to save his son Jamal involved accused in the case in hand. Accused 
Akmal has not committed Zina with me. He is innocent.105 
On April 17, 2002, the Sessions Court announced the verdict. Akmal 
Khan was acquitted of the offenses charged for lack of evidence. How-
ever, Zafran Bibi was found guilty of the offense of zina liable to hadd, 
and the court imposed the punishment of rajm. No action was directed 
against Jamal, Zafran Bibi’s brother-in-law, as he had neither been 
named in the F.I.R. nor charged with any offense. 
Since a hadd punishment cannot be executed unless confirmed by the 
FSC,106 Zafran Bibi’s conviction and sentence were appealed. Delivering 
the judgment of the Court, Justice Fida Muhammad Khan held: 
[M]ere pregnancy, by itself when there is no other evidence at all, of a 
married lady, having no access to her husband, or even of an unmarried 
girl is no ground for imposition of Hadd punishment if she comes out 
with the defence that that was the result of commission of rape with 
her.107 
On the burden of proving consent, the Court reiterated that “the cardi-
nal principle of Islamic Criminal Law that conviction of someone for 
commission of unlawful sexual intercourse, it is not only necessary to 
make certain that he/she committed that act, but it is also to be ensured 
that he/she committed that of his/her own free-will.”108 Finally, as re-
gards the requirements for confessions to form the basis for a conviction, 
the Court emphatically stated: 
It is pertinent to mention that the confession to be effective in the con-
text of the Ordinance, firstly must be voluntary, with free consent with-
out any coercion or inducement, secondly must be explicit as to the 
commission of the actual offence of Zina with free-will, thirdly must be 
four times in four different meetings as held in a number of cases by 
Federal Shariat Court and Shariat Appellate Bench and, fourthly, must 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. at 10. 
 106. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 107. Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. at 15. 
 108. Id. at 17. Nonetheless, despite these forceful pronouncements, the Court managed 
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be recorded by the Court who has competent jurisdiction to try the of-
fence under the law.109 
In some measure of consonance with the dicta of Rani, the Court stated 
that though delay in lodging a F.I.R. normally weighs negatively against 
an accused, that is not a hard and fast rule. In cases of zina, which in-
variably concern family honor, “mere delay per se is no ground for draw-
ing [an] adverse inference.”110 Accordingly, the Court overturned Zafran 
Bibi’s conviction. 
H. Gul Hamida v. State (2004)111 
Yet another appeal from a conviction where pregnancy was used as 
proof of zina reached the FSC in 2004. Gul Hamida had been pregnant 
for approximately eight months at the time she lodged the F.I.R. She al-
leged that her pregnancy was the result of a rape committed by two men. 
The Sessions Court convicted her of zina, but acquitted the accused rap-
ists.112 The court inferred Gul Hamida’s guilt from two circumstances: (i) 
her pregnancy, and (ii) her failure to disclose the rape for close to eight 
months. 
The FSC overturned Gul Hamida’s conviction, noting that she had vol-
untarily lodged the F.I.R. and had adequately explained her delay: 
It is a known fact that in our society the girls are ordinarily hesitant to 
disclose such an unfortunate incident out of fear or infamy. There is 
always a lurking fear in the mind of the victim that she may herself be 
held an accused of the sin or the offence. The same apparently has hap-
pened in case of the appellant.113 
On the issue of the evidentiary value of pregnancy, the FSC held: 
In the absence of any positive evidence merely on the basis of preg-
nancy it cannot be presumed that the victim girl was a willing partner. 
To record conviction under the Hudood Ordinance, evidence of an un-
impeachable character is required.114 
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I. Summation 
With the exception of Jehan Mina, the FSC cases reviewed have 
clearly and consistently laid down the following rules regarding the use 
of the evidence of pregnancy in framing charges of zina against a 
woman: 
1. Consent is a vital element of the offense of zina. It must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt through direct eyewitness testimony, and 
medical as well as other circumstantial evidence. Evidence of an unex-
plained pregnancy, in and of itself, is not conclusive proof of consent.115 
2. When a woman alleges rape, she cannot be implicated in a case of 
zina. If a woman is charged with zina on account of her pregnancy and, 
in her defense, she alleges that she had been raped, then she must be ac-
quitted regardless of whether or not she complained at the time of the 
rape. Any delay in lodging an F.I.R., or even an outright failure to do so, 
is irrelevant when rape is alleged.116 
IV. THE CONTROVERSIES 
The jurisprudence of the Federal Shariat Court analyzed in this paper 
provides valuable insight into the nature of the debate between the pro-
ponents and the opponents of the Hudood laws. The following are some 
of the main arguments and counterarguments advanced by both sides: 
A. The Standard Critique 
The opponents of the Hudood laws have argued all along that the Zina 
Ordinance is blatantly discriminatory on its face as well as in its conse-
quences.117 For instance, they argue that the Zina Ordinance discrimi-
                                                                                                             
 115. This rule might only be applicable in cases where a female is accused of zina. In a 
recent case, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court considered a woman’s 
pregnancy as evidence against a male accused. Muhammad Sharif v. State, 2006 
S.C.M.R. 1170 (2005). Charges of enticing and zina were brought against the defendant 
after his sister-in-law died while undergoing an abortion. Id. at 1171. The defendant’s 
conviction was upheld based upon evidence that the deceased had resided with him prior 
to her death, presumably to hide her pregnancy. Id. at 1173.  
 116. This is in conformity with Hanafi and Shafi fiqh. See supra text accompanying 
notes 93–95. 
 117. See, e.g., NCSW Report, supra note 20, at 14; Quraishi, supra note 45, at 309. 
However, Charles Kennedy points out that the overwhelming number―eighty-two per-
cent―of defendants in Hudood cases are men, and that “84% of those convicted in dis-
trict and sessions courts . . . and 90% of those whose convictions are upheld by the FSC 
are men.”  Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 312. Even as regards 
cases of zina, a facially gender-neutral offense, the study found that “56% of those con-
victed of this crime by district and sessions courts, and 70% of those convicted by the 
FSC were men.” Id. Therefore, Kennedy argues, “[o]ne may have legitimate quarrels 
150 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:1 
nates against women through its evidentiary rules requiring four Muslim 
male witnesses to impose hadd punishment in zina-bil-jabr cases.118 
Since it is highly unlikely that a rape will be committed in the presence 
of, or be passively witnessed by, four men of a good character, it is al-
most inconceivable how a hadd conviction for zina-bil-jabr could ever 
materialize. Furthermore, if a rape is witnessed by four women instead of 
four men, hadd punishment cannot be awarded. As a result, this require-
ment deters rape victims from complaining, and indirectly encourages 
the incidence of rape. 
An even more serious consequence of the promulgation of the Zina 
Ordinance has been the equation of rape with zina. This equation is not 
merely nominal, but substantive and substantial in that the Ordinance is 
regularly misused to convert complaints of zina-bil-jabr, or rape, into 
those of zina when the accuser fails to bring sufficient evidence to prove 
rape.119 This is invariably the case in a criminal justice system character-
                                                                                                             
with the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, but gender bias against women is not 
one of them.”  Id. at 313. For an explicit rebuttal of Kennedy’s argument, see JAHANGIR 
& JILANI, supra note 2, at 137–38. They contend that the figures are misleading since a 
number of cases are converted from rape to zina. Id. However, it is difficult to understand 
how this makes any difference, since both offenses are prosecuted under the Ordinance. 
If their point is meant to suggest that more men are convicted under the Ordinance be-
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ment. This though would then suggest that at least some men who are guilty of rape, if 
not all, are charged with zina-bil-jabr and convicted of that offense, and that number far 
exceeds the number of women prosecuted for and convicted of zina. See Kennedy, Islam-
ization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 312–13. 
 118. As Salman Akram Raja has noted, this is not a fully informed argument: 
The popular perception of the Zina Ordinance, largely based on the image car-
ried in the press, is that a raped woman must produce four male witnesses 
against the accused for a conviction. The legal position that a conviction lead-
ing to a tazir punishment can be maintained on the basis of other evidence, in-
cluding that of the woman herself, is generally absent in the popular under-
standing of the Zina Ordinance. 
Salman Akram Raja, Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan, 2 S. ASIAN J. 94 (2003), available 
at http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/islamisation_laws.htm. 
 119. It has been recommended that until the Zina Ordinance is repealed, the offenses of 
zina and zina-bil-jabr should be separated out into separate sections of the statute. This is 
recommended because: 
The police frequently register rape complaints simply under Section 10 of the 
Zina Ordinance, without specifying the applicable subsection. The ensuing am-
biguity as to the type of crime in question not only mars the police investigation 
but also leads to additional trauma for the rape victim because of the potential 
created for a wrongful prosecution for adultery.  
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ized by inadequate investigative and evidentiary mechanisms. The vic-
tim’s situation is made worse should she become pregnant, in which case 
many trial courts are quick to assume that she is only alleging rape to 
cover up the illegitimate pregnancy. Thus, women, who are already rele-
gated to a lesser status in various social, political, and economic settings 
in Pakistan, are unable and justifiably unwilling to complain when their 
physical sanctity is violated. 
The Zina Ordinance has also provided disgruntled parents, brothers, 
and former spouses with an opportunity to malign young women in order 
to deter them from rebelling against the predominantly patriarchal family 
structures by asserting the rights of free choice in marriage and divorce, 
or sometimes even the right to live a financially independent life.120 A 
majority of zina cases, it is argued, are malicious prosecutions that have 
the net effect of reinforcing the socio-economic subservience of women 
to the entrenched patriarchal norms.121 These facets of the Hudood laws 
and their implementation support the discriminatory milieu of Pakistani 
society. So, even if such cases ultimately end in acquittal, the women 
who are subjected to the humiliations of trial have already suffered ir-
reparable injustice. 
B. A Staunch Defense 
The above criticism is usually answered with the assertion that hadd 
punishments are fixed maximum punishments that are to be administered 
in the clearest of cases only: when the accused has freely confessed or 
evidence is available which proves the crime beyond all doubt.122 Since 
such proof is not usually forthcoming, hadd punishments act as a deter-
rent only, serving the vital function of laying down fundamental moral 
principles. In fact, there have been no cases in Pakistan in which hadd 
punishments have been executed for either zina or zina-bil-jabr.123 The 
majority of cases under the Hudood laws are cases of tazir offenses, 
                                                                                                             
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 8. 
 120. See Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 316 (“Added to the nor-
mal social control mechanisms available to them, parents, husbands, and guardians have 
been empowered by the introduction of the Hudood Ordinances with the real or implicit 
threat of bringing criminal charges against their children or wives.”). 
 121. See Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 217–29. 
 122. For example, Chief Justice Fazal Ilahi Khan, in Zafran Bibi, stated that “it is 
much better that an Imam (i.e. Judge) should err in acquitting someone rather than he 
should err in punishing someone (who is not guilty).”  Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. 
at 17. 
 123. See, e.g., JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 47. Though acknowledging that a 
hadd punishment has never been executed, Jahangir and Jilani nevertheless argue that its 
existence and potential for misuse require its abolition. Id. 
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where convictions are based on the same evidentiary standards that are 
applicable in normal criminal trials. 
It is also argued that though miscarriages of justice do occur during the 
trial stage of some Hudood laws cases, just as miscarriages occur in trials 
for all offenses in Pakistan’s defective criminal justice system, those er-
rors are corrected by the appellate courts in all but a few cases.124 Thus, 
the Hudood laws’ supporters argue that there are no problems inherent in 
the substantive rules laid down by the Zina Ordinance, as the injustices 
and controversies result from their misapplication. Such sentiments were 
expressed by the FSC in Zafran Bibi: 
On account of disinformation, misunderstanding, lack of knowledge of 
the facts and circumstances of the case, some organizations resorted 
even to take out processions and demand repeal of the Hudood Laws it-
self without realizing that it was not the laws of Hudood (i.e. fixed sen-
tence prescribed by Holy Qur’an and Sunnah) but its misapplication 
that resulted in miscarriage of justice . . . . Like other laws, the prose-
cuting or other components of law-enforcing machinery may err in its 
application in respect to various facts and circumstances, however, the 
ideal nature of these laws . . . is admittedly far-superior to the man-
made laws on account of its highly balanced approach to individual and 
public interest.125 
Therefore, in defense of the Hudood laws, their proponents ultimately 
argue that the laws themselves are not problematic. Rather, it is their 
misapplication and misuse by the police and trial courts that results in the 
miscarriage of justice.126 
C. Resolution of the Political Impasse 
It is precisely at this juncture that the debate has come to an impasse; 
both sides believe that they have a sufficient basis for their respective 
positions, and a satisfactory resolution appears to be presently out of 
                                                                                                             
 124. As Charles Kennedy points out, “[b]ecause the percentage of acquittals on appeal 
is so high it is doubly important to note the speed with which cases are disposed by the 
courts.”  Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 311. Kennedy’s study 
found that the average time taken by the FSC in disposing of cases was reduced from 
eleven months in 1981 to four months in 1987. The sessions courts, on the other hand, 
lagged behind, taking an average of eighteen months to decide cases after the F.I.R. was 
filed. Id. 
 125. Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. at 12. 
 126. See Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 311–15 (describing how 
the problems affiliated with the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances are precisely 
those which plague the entire criminal justice system in Pakistan). 
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reach. Further, the controversies have become politicized to such an ex-
tent that it is impossible for either side to retrench. 
The opposition to the Hudood laws has thus far focused on campaign-
ing for an outright repeal of these laws.127 This approach is unlikely to 
succeed so long as the vast majority of Pakistani citizens continue to be-
lieve that the Hudood laws correctly reflect the shari’ah, a conviction 
based on the fact that the Qu’ran expressly proscribes zina and assigns 
punishment for it.128 However, few are cognizant of the reality that the 
Hudood laws misrepresent the shari’ah in certain vital respects, and that 
there are glaring defects in the legislation, such as the provision for pun-
ishment of zina as tazir. 
In such a situation, it is not only unfair to decry the shari’ah for the 
failings of the Hudood laws, which are only a cheap imitation, but it is 
also impractical to argue for their outright repeal. The only viable option 
is to advocate for such amendments to the Hudood laws that would obvi-
ate the injustices perpetrated in the name of the shari’ah. However, such 
amendments are not likely to be made until a convincing critique is gen-
erated, which questions the Hudood laws’ doctrinal foundations and 
highlights the discrepancies between the shari’ah doctrines and its coun-
terfeit version presently in force. The possibility of such an “Islamic” 
critique has already been demonstrated.129 
Such a possibility can be seen in the jurisprudence of the FSC, which 
implicitly demonstrates the strength of such a critique. Consider again 
Zafran Bibi, where the Court, prior to reaffirming the principle that preg-
nancy by itself may not be used to prove the commission of zina, ap-
peared to suggest the existence of some circumstances in which preg-
nancy will become sufficient corroborating evidence: 
There is nothing on record to even presume that she was a woman of 
easy virtue. There is also no iota of evidence to show even that she was 
having any illicit liaison with any male person. The available record is 
also completely silent about her having been seen in the company of 
any accused, nominated by her in her statements.130 
Likewise, in Gul Hamida, the FSC noted that conviction for zina may 
be based on circumstantial evidence, presumably including evidence of 
pregnancy: 
                                                                                                             
 127. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 7; see also supra note 20. 
 128. See Qur’an 4:15 and 24:2. 
 129. See Quraishi, supra note 45, at 313 (arguing that the Quranic requirements for the 
punishment of zina do not leave room for it to be tried as a tazir offense). 
 130. Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. at 14. 
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No doubt conviction can be based on the strength of circumstantial evi-
dence but the circumstances should be of such a nature which are unex-
ceptionable and which lead to no other inference or hypothesis except 
the guilt of the accused and commission of the offence.131 
This language is reminiscent to that found in Safia Bibi, where the 
Court stated that consent could not be established “in the absence of any 
evidence . . . that [Safia Bibi] and Maqsood Ahmad had any sentimental 
attachment for and were on intimate terms with one another.”132 Like-
wise, in Rafaqat Bibi, the Court held that “in absence of any evidence to 
establish sentimental attachment for co-accused it could not be said that 
sexual intercourse was indulged into willfully.”133 
However, refer to the FSC’s mechanically precise statement of the 
elements of the offense of zina in Rani: 
i. there should be a man and a woman; 
ii. such man and a woman are not validly married to each other; 
iii. such man and woman should have committed sexual intercourse 
with each other; 
iv. such man and woman should have committed sexual intercourse 
willfully; 
v. there ought to be a penetration.134 
Important here is that consent has to coincide with the act of sexual in-
tercourse, or penetration. Even if the accused is reputed to be a woman of 
“easy virtue,” the prosecution still has to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that at the time of the alleged incident she willfully had had sexual 
intercourse. The same holds true if a woman had had a prior “illicit liai-
son” with her male co-accused, or if there was sentimental attachment. 
More than talking, holding hands, kissing, touching, or even fondling is 
required to secure a conviction. Also note that in Sakina there was credi-
ble evidence that prior to elopement the accused had had an intimate re-
lationship characterized by “sentimental involvement.”135 Similarly, in 
Rani there were allegations that the accused was reputed to be a woman 
of “easy virtue.”136 In fact, the defense in Rani was that the accused’s 
family had forced her into prostitution. Yet, in neither case was the extra-
                                                                                                             
 131. Gul Hamida, 2005 P.Cr.L.J. at 171. 
 132. Safia Bibi, 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. at 123. 
 133. Rafaqat Bibi, N.L.R. 1984 S.D. at 167. 
 134. Rani, 35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. at 156 (citing Sukhan v. State, 1985 P.Cr.L.J. 110, 
118–19 (F.S.C. 1984)). 
 135. Sakina, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. at 321. 
 136. Rani, 35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. at 152. 
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marital pregnancy corroborated by such other evidence found sufficient 
to secure a conviction for zina.  
If the above analysis is correct, in what circumstances may an accused 
be convicted for an offense of zina liable to tazir? Apparently, the only 
circumstances where a conviction can properly be secured is when there 
are eyewitnesses, but numbering less than four, or, hypothetically, when 
there is other conclusive evidence such as a video-recording. If there are 
less than four witnesses, initiating a prosecution for zina is tantamount to 
qazf (unwarranted accusation of zina) under recognized shari’ah princi-
ples.137 
In Muhammad Masood v. Abdullah,138 Justice Maulana Muhammad 
Taqi Usmani, an alim (religious scholar) member, delivered the judg-
ment of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court holding that 
someone who bears false witness in a case of zina will not be guilty of 
qazf until the Court formally declares that such a witness has lied.139 
However, the complainant in a case of zina will only avoid liability un-
der the Qazf Ordinance if he or she can bring four eyewitnesses. In the 
absence of four eyewitnesses, the complainant will automatically be 
deemed guilty of qazf whether or not a court declares that he or she has 
lied. Further, the Court expressly overruled an earlier FSC decision 
which had held that a complainant of zina who fails to produce four 
eyewitnesses may only be liable for qazf if the accusation of zina had 
been made in bad faith.140 
It is very difficult to reconcile Muhammad Masood with Section 10 of 
the Zina Ordinance. When a case of zina is prosecuted in the absence of 
four eyewitnesses, which is practically all zina cases since most are tazir 
cases, will the court convict the accused for zina while simultaneously 
convicting the complainant of qazf? Following this line of reasoning, it is 
extremely difficult to conceive of many circumstances in which a prose-
cution for zina liable to tazir may be initiated. Unfortunately, however, 
this contradiction in the FSC’s jurisprudence has not been pressed upon 
the Shariat courts or the Pakistani legislature. 
                                                                                                             
 137. The law of qazf is derived from verse 24:4 of the Qur’an. See supra note 45. In 
practice, zina prosecutions have overwhelmingly outnumbered qazf cases. See CIW Re-
port, supra note 20, at 70 (documenting that only forty-three qazf cases were filed in the 
FSC between 1980 and 1987, as compared to 3,399 zina cases). 
 138. 1992 S.C.M.R. 638 (1992). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (overruling Muhammad Bashir v. State, 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. 384, 394 
(1985)). 
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D. Reformation of the Hudood laws 
Reform, pursuant to an Islamic critique, rather than repeal, represents 
the only hope for resolving the intractable argumentation over the Hu-
dood laws. Preferably, such reform should be implemented through ap-
propriate amendments to the Hudood Ordinances. However, until such 
amendments become politically feasible, it is advisable to press for the 
reformation of Hudood laws before the Shariat courts. After all, the 
Shariat courts have the power to review legislation for compatibility with 
shari’ah principles. 
At the least, the Shariat courts should be asked to harmonize their own 
jurisprudence so that their precedents may be widely known, followed 
where applicable, or critiqued if they represent a perversion of Islamic 
injunctions. Until now, the FSC has failed to regularly refer to its own 
previous judgments, or rationalize them. For example, in the cases re-
viewed, only Rani discussed prior FSC precedent.141 In Zafran Bibi, the 
Court failed to refer to any of its own precedents, including Safia Bibi, 
which followed a similar reasoning. A harmonization of the law will en-
able lawyers to cite the appropriate cases before the trial courts, ensuring 
that errors of law are reduced. In order to achieve this, academics, human 
rights activists, and women’s rights campaigners should give greater at-
tention to researching and analyzing the jurisprudence of the Shariat 
courts in Pakistan.142 This will enable them to disseminate relevant and 
                                                                                                             
 141. See Rani, 35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. at 151–59 (using the holdings of Sakina, Safia 
Bibi, and Siani to disagree with the holding of Jehan Mina). 
 142. The critics of the Hudood laws have thus far focused primarily on those decisions 
of the Sessions courts embodying miscarriages of justice and case studies of police bru-
tality. Further, the critics have shown such a distrust of the FSC that they have failed to 
carefully analyze its decisions. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. As Julie Dror 
Chadbourne notes, this approach is not only incomplete, but it is also fundamentally un-
helpful: 
Despite the social, legal and political impact of the Zina Ordinance in Pakistan, 
there is still little or no analysis of the substantive law relating to the Offence of 
Zina. . . . Instead, Pakistani practitioners as well as the Western media have fo-
cused their energies on publicizing a few “shocking” cases and on expressing 
their beliefs that the Ordinance is wrong and must be repealed. While it is true 
that there are problems with the Ordinance and that it has the capacity to sup-
port a social system which is highly biased against women, it is crucial that ac-
tivists stop the debate on these points long enough to understand how the Ordi-
nance actually affects the lives of women and girls in Pakistan. Until they do, 
they will remain denuded in their advocacy efforts because they will see neither 
the true impact the Zina Ordinance has on people living in Pakistan nor will 
they see that in the eye of the storm the judiciary is their greatest ally in amelio-
rating the practical impact of the Zina Ordinance. 
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correct information to all concerned parties, including the public. Such 
efforts will also facilitate more effective representation of the innocent 
victims. 
The second range of options that ought to be pursued is to advocate the 
adoption of enhanced procedural safeguards. For instance, Parliament 
passed the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004,143 which mandates 
that only a senior police officer of the rank of superintendent may con-
duct an investigation in a case of zina, and an arrest may be made only 
with the permission of the court.144 These provisions do not apply to 
cases of zina-bil-jabr. Other procedural safeguards may include the ap-
pointment of specialist and more qualified judges for Hudood trials in the 
Sessions Courts. Alternatively, the FSC may be decreed the trial court in 
Hudood laws cases. The FSC is arguably more competent to try such 
cases, and has demonstrated a much more refined approach towards the 
enforcement of Hudood laws than the Sessions Courts. Further, it may be 
made mandatory for adequate medical tests to be performed in cases of 
zina before any prosecutions are initiated. Though this would require 
significant expenditure for the necessary facilities and infrastructure, the 
development of adequate forensic investigation mechanisms is a pressing 
need and such an effort is feasible as well as easily justified.145 
                                                                                                             
Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 180. 
 143. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004 (Act I of 2005), reprinted in 57 P.L.D. 
2005 Federal Statutes 77 (2005). 
 144. Section 13 of the Act, which amends Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, reads: 
13. Amendment in Chapter XIV, Act V of 1898. ―In the Code, of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), hereinafter referred to as the Code, after sec-
tion 156, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:— 
. . . . 
156B. Investigation against a woman accused of the offence of Zina. Notwith-
standing anything contained in this Code, where a person is accused of offence 
of Zina under Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (VII 
of 1979), no police officer below the rank of a Superintendent of Police shall 
investigate such offence nor shall such accused be arrested without permission 
of the Court. 
Explanation. —In this section ‘Zina’ does not include ‘Zina-bil-Jabr’. 
Id. at 79–80. 
 145. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 10–16 (suggesting rec-
ommended reforms for police practice and the medicolegal system).   
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V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to expand the debate concerning the Hudood 
laws and their enforcement in Pakistan. It has done so through examina-
tion of the FSC’s precedents on the controversial issue of pregnancy as 
proof of zina. Admittedly, sufficient evidence has not been adduced to 
conclusively prove that the Shariat courts have developed an approach 
that has rebutted the criticisms of the skeptics.146 In fact, it has not even 
been argued that the Shariat courts are capable, by themselves, of resolv-
ing all the difficulties. This is because many of the current problems are 
rooted in the investigative, prosecutorial, and procedural deficiencies of 
Pakistan’s criminal justice system, and are therefore beyond remediation 
through reform of substantive laws. 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the debate concerning the Hudood 
laws in Pakistan has been both misleading and unproductive, because not 
all of the relevant aspects and nuances of the issues have been explored. 
First, the role of the Shariat courts in shaping the law through the imple-
mentation of coherent and just Islamic doctrines of criminal liability has 
been overlooked. Second, the possibility of obviating some of the proce-
dural defects in the criminal justice system, not only in the context of the 
Hudood laws but also other “secular” criminal laws, has also been under-
estimated. If a more nuanced perspective on the Hudood laws is 
adopted―incorporating the possibility of substantive reform in accor-
dance with an Islamic critique implemented preferably through statutory 
amendments, coherent case law, enhanced procedural safeguards, and a 
general reform of the criminal justice system―this may lead to a resolu-
tion of these controversies. The alternative is a continuation of an ideo-
logical struggle in which the politicos win but the victims lose out. 
VI. POSTSCRIPT 
As of the date of publication, the processes of reform advocated in this 
paper have begun to materialize. For the first time since the enactment of 
the Hudood Ordinances, mainstream news media organizations in Paki-
stan have started a dialogue on the laws and their the conformity to Is-
lamic injunctions.147 Additionally, on November 15, 2006, the “Protec-
                                                                                                             
 146. But see Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 309–11 (arguing that 
the statistical data on the disposition of Hudood Ordinances appeals shows that the FSC 
has played a significant role in moderating the zealousness and remedying the incompe-
tence of sessions court judges). 
 147. This public debate began when Geo Television, a leading Urdu-language Paki-
stani television network, launched a series of programs entitled Zara Sochieye. Zara So-
chieye, http://www.geo.tv/zs. In these programs, notable religious scholars, lawyers, for-
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tion of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Bill”148 was passed by the 
National Assembly after receiving support from both the government and 
several opposition parties.149 The bill proposes several major changes to 
the Zina Ordinance: 
 
1. Abolition of the offense of zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd; 
2. Abolition of the offense of zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir and rein-
statement of the pre-Hudood rape provisions in the Pakistan Pe-
nal Code, including the removal of the marital rape exemption; 
3. Abolition of the offense of zina liable to tazir; 
4. Introduction of the offense of public lewdness in the Pakistan 
Penal Code; 
5. Abolition of the penalty of rajm for zina liable to hadd; 
6. Abolition of the mandatory death sentence for the offense of 
gang rape, and replacing in its stead a discretionary sentence of 
either death or life imprisonment; 
7. Criminalization of the publication of a case of zina or rape; 
8. Zina shall be cognizable only by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion upon the presentation of four witnesses; and  
9. Qazf proceedings may automatically be instituted by a court 
where a complaint of zina has been made but four witnesses are 
not presented. 
 
The bill has been passed amidst steadfast claims by the government 
that the proposed amendments conform to Islamic injunctions.150 As 
noted in the bill’s statement of objects and reasons: “The primary object 
of all these amendments is to make zina and qazf punishable only in ac-
cordance with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an 
and Sunnah, to prevent exploitation, curb abuse of police powers and 
                                                                                                             
mer judges, and other intellectuals questioned whether the Hudood Ordinances com-
pletely conform to the injunctions of the Qu’ran and Sunnah. 
 148. A copy of the bill, as originally presented in the National Assembly, is available 
at http://www.dawn.com/2006/08/24/nat3.htm. The version passed by the National As-
sembly, however, includes certain amendments to the original version. 
 149.  Ifran Ghauri, NA Passes Women’s Protection Bill, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Nov. 16, 
2006, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C11%5C16 
%5Cstory_16-11-2006_pg1_3. Before the bill becomes law, it must now be approved by 
the Pakistani Senate.    
 150. See, e.g., Prove It Un-Islamic and I’ll Resign: Shujaat, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Nov. 
16, 2006, available at http://216.122.144.99/default.asp?page=2006\11\16\story_16-11-
2006_pg1_5.  
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create a just and egalitarian society.”151 Opponents of the bill from the 
religious right, however, have criticized it as being “un-Islamic.”152  
Some civil society and human rights organizations have also been vo-
cal in their criticism of the bill. They believe the bill does not go far 
enough, and insist that the Hudood Ordinances be repealed outright.153 
Nevertheless, most Pakistani commentators perceive the bill as being a 
step in the right direction. 
                                                                                                             
 151. Raja Asghar, Pakistan: Opposition Up in Arms over Women’s Rights Bill, 
MUSLIM NEWS (U.K.), Aug. 22, 2006, available at http://www.muslimnews.co.uk 
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